The Moroccan Non-Exception: 'Much Loved' and Realism, Colonialism, and Pornography in Moroccan Cinema

[Screenshot of the trailer for the film \ [Screenshot of the trailer for the film \

The Moroccan Non-Exception: 'Much Loved' and Realism, Colonialism, and Pornography in Moroccan Cinema

By : Nadir Bouhmouch

[The following is the second installment in "The Moroccan Non-Exception" Jadaliyya roundtable. Read the introduction here.]

A wave of contentious reactions have dominated the Moroccan media landscape following the release of Nabil Ayouch`s new film Much Loved, a fictional story about three Moroccan prostitutes in Marrakech. The reactions to the film are based on several extracts and a trailer that emerged online, some of which contained sexually explicit scenes. The excerpts were released just before the film’s screening at the Quinzaine des Realisateurs in Cannes. The reaction culminated with the Moroccan Ministry of Communications` illegal censorship of the film. The reactions to the film raised questions in Moroccan Francophone press, as well as among some European critics, about how viewers could be so angry at a film they have not yet seen in its entirety.

Labeling the entire backlash as reactionary, the Francophone press largely ignored the variety and complexity of the responses. Some of the writings have described public anger as “sick,” “retrograde,” violent, “anchored in tradition,” “medieval,” “Islamist,” and people as “packs,” “cowardly,” and “populist.” In one op-ed, the author speaks of “incomprehensible negative reactions,” a phrase reminiscent of the French journalist’s narration toward the end of The Battle of Algiers: “incomprehensible ululations coming from Kasbah.” Like the journalist struggling to understand why Algerians rebelled against colonialism, the Francophone press’ lack of comprehension demonstrates a detachment from the social, political, and historical context from which such a “revolt” can emerge. They view it merely as a symptom of Moroccan backwardness, rendering them incapable of understanding art.

This article brings into question the assertions critics made about the film, particularly with regard to the question of Realism, and about the contentious reactions toward it; to attempt to understand the widespread negative sentiment toward the film in a nuanced way, through a colonial and neo-colonial historical framework; and to shed light on the sexist and orientalist tendencies found in the film which partially incited the negative reactions. This piece is, above all, a commentary on the critiques (both in the press and among average Moroccans who firmly opposed the film) rather than a critique of the film itself. This article does not hesitate, however, to critically examine the film in order to better understand the anger leveled against it. The first section of this article is centered around the most common argument in favor of the film amongst critics: its realist portrayal of the act of prostitution and how some Moroccan critics claim it is an appropriate method of influencing society and changing sentiment toward prostitutes. The second part is an attempt to historically situate Moroccan cinema within a colonial and neo-colonial context in order to make sense of what could be the source of the “revolt” against the film. The last section, treading more along a fine line between a critique of the film itself and a critique of the critiques, addresses how the film can be seen as a continuation of both sexist and orientalist “colonial discourse” and how this discourse can be counterproductive to the film’s stated objective of changing attitudes toward prostitutes and women in general in Moroccan society. This piece draws from a large number of comments made on social media, discussions with Moroccans from various social classes who expressed their discontent with the film and notes on the almost omnipresent loud debates about the film that took place in Casablanca’s cafés throughout late May and early June 2015. Their thoughts and beliefs are presented throughout this article, in contrast with the assertions made by critics in the Francophone press and situated within the social and historical context that could have produced them. 

Reality vs. Realism 

Through a multitude of articles that emerged in the Francophone press (both Moroccan and French), some critics accused those who reacted negatively to the film of being incapable of understanding Realism. This accusation is the basis for almost all of the writings in defense of Much Loved. The film, according to those who defended it, is merely a depiction of a social reality (TelQuel’s Abdellah Tourabi goes as far as to say that the film is “between documentary and fiction”). Yet, it is precisely because the film claims to portray a social reality that it is subject to a social criticism. As Shohat and Stam highlight in citing Mikhail Bakhtin: “art is incontrovertibly social, not because it represents the real but because it constitutes a historically situated ‘utterance’-- a complex of signs addressed by one socially constituted subject or subjects to other socially constituted subjects, all of whom are deeply immersed in historical circumstance and social contingency.”[1]

Just like one can understand the “incomprehensible ululations coming from the Kasbah” after having understood the history of violence France inflicted upon Algerians, one can also understand the “incomprehensible negative reactions” after having understood Much Loved as a “historically situated ‘utterance.’” Popular frustration with the film, even if it is merely based on extracts, is not senseless, uniform, or random. This frustration is conscious, or partly conscious, of what is driving it and, when placed in a historical context of colonial domination and the current context of neo-colonial domination-- economic, social, political, and cultural-- can be understood as a sound reaction. “That something vital is at stake in these debates” about cinema, write Shohat and Stam, “becomes obvious in those instances when entire communities passionately protest the representations that are made of them in the name of their own experiential sense of truth.”

What is at stake in these debates is the masses’ lived reality or their conception of that lived reality. Therefore, people are not necessarily concerned with the film itself but rather with the violating function it serves and how it is affected by and affects that social reality from which it emerged. For this reason, it becomes ironic when, Mahi Binebine writes in “Allez censeurs du dimanche brulez tout!”  (Come on Amateur Censors, Burn it All!), that those reacting against the film are doing so because they are afraid of a "mirror image" of their society, when in fact most Moroccans experience or are familiar with the conditions that create that “mirror image.” To be clearer, the widespread dire conditions in Morocco--which vary from poverty to overall lack of proper education and healthcare--yield the circumstances and reality from which this "mirror image" emerges. Indeed, some of the contentious opinions that were loudly expressed in cafés, social media, and the Arabic language press toward the film were drawn from a proclaimed familiarity with reality (“we do not need Ayouch to come from France to tell us what we already know”) in order to criticize the film and a filmmaker whom they perceive as paternalistic.

A vast majority of Francophone critics ignored his perceived paternalism, many actually glorified Ayouch as a benevolent figure and--after the film’s censorship--described him as a liberal martyr “lynched” by intolerant mobs. Preoccupied by the intensity of negative reactions, most Francophone critics failed to question the filmmaker’s self-proclaimed benevolence and evaluate the effectiveness of the film’s Realist approach toward achieving its stated objective of affecting social change. Some critics have treated the “accurate and realistic portrayal," indisputably, as the most effective way to change Moroccan society through film. No questions were asked about whether, to put it in Tomas Guiterez Alea’s words,  “cinema can draw viewers closer to reality without giving up its condition of unreality, fiction, and other-reality” or whether it “brings about in viewers, once they have stopped being viewers and are facing that other aspect of reality (the viewers’ own life, their daily reality), a series of reasonings, judgments, ideas and thus a better comprehension of reality itself and an adaptation of their behavior, of their practical activity.”[2] 

Indeed, it is important to consider the importance of reality over its “mirror image.” According to Argentinian filmmakers Octavio Getino and Fernando Solanas, for bourgeois cinema, “the image of reality is more important than reality itself” as it can have the adverse function of normalizing or even disguising that reality.[3] Whereas some opinions expressed against the film demonstrate an interest in the function of cinema as something that affects their reality, some of the writings in favor of the film have tended to focus on how it functions on the screen.

What critics missed--this point on the effectiveness of the film as a means for inspiring social change--online viewers picked up on. Some interlocutors on social media, for example, who asked, “do we really need to use vulgar words and pornography to make [a] social change?” echoed similar questions and statements heard in loud conversations in Casaoui cafés. In its essence, this question raises the issue of accessibility and how vulgar words and pornographic scenes can make the film inaccessible to a large part of Moroccan society. Other comments made toward the film were also reminiscent of Alea’s The Viewers Dialectic: “The most socially productive show surely cannot be one which limits itself to being a more or less precise reflection of reality just as reality offers itself in its immediacy. That would be no more than a duplication of the image we already have of reality, a redundancy.”

The point here is not to say that Realism is entirely inappropriate for or completely misunderstood in the Moroccan context. In fact we can cite a plethora of realist Moroccan films that have been accessible and to varying extents, effective-- from Alyam Alyam (1978) to L’Orchestre des Aveugles (2015). Rather, the point is to raise questions about in which situations is it effective for a film to try to imitate reality as closely as possible, what aspects of reality should be left out to ensure that a film is not detrimental to people who live within the reality being depicted, and when should allusions or abstract depictions be made.

The Colonial Context of the Cinema in Morocco

Here, it is useful to return to the idea that Much Loved-- whether it is truly Realist or not, whether it is socially effective or not-- is a “historically situated utterance.” Although a multitude of important political, economic, religious, linguistic and cultural factors affect Moroccans, all of which have a significant impact on the way they understand cinematic representations of the real, we cannot make sense of the “revolt” against Much Loved without historically contextualizing it. Since film and photography were both introduced to Morocco during the colonial era (as Shohat and Stam point out, cinema itself was born at the “giddy height of imperialism”), for purposes of brevity, this article will only focus on the historical factors that impacted Moroccan filmmaking since that period. The intention here is not to downplay the importance of other factors which precede the colonial era, nor is it to claim that historic factors are the most essential or relevant. It is rather to demonstrate that there is some continuity of colonial discourse in Moroccan cinema that may explain (in conjunction with other factors which I am incapable of fully addressing here) some of the hostility toward image-makers.

Out of the articles, critiques, and reviews that some Moroccan critics published in defense of the film, several evoked literary works that defied taboos in Moroccan history in order to make the point that Moroccan society has regressed and become less tolerant. Binebine, for example, compares Much Loved to Moroccan literary classics like Mohammed Choukri’s For Bread Alone. Yet, images and words are not equivalent. Ignoring the particular histories of how these two artistic mediums have functioned, in addition to their varying accessibility (almost half the population is illiterate) to the average Moroccan, this argument is oblivious to the relationship Moroccans have to them.

North Africans have often owned their words (especially spoken words that are accessible to all) and have a long history of using them to break "taboos," from Abu Nawas’ poetry to Cheikha Rimitti’s lyrics. Yet images--particularly “realist” images in photography and film--have historically functioned as a means to promote and justify colonialism. Jean Rouch points out that the 1934 Laval Decree, which France implemented in its African colonies in order to regulate cinema, “served as a pretext to deny young Africans…the right to film their own countries.”[4] In Morocco specifically, the additional dahirs (royal decrees) of 9 December 1940; 14 August 1941; and 18 April 1942 effectively put cinema under strict French control and censorship.[5] It was in this spirit that the Centre Cinematographique Marocain (CCM) was founded in 1944. Representing the Moroccan through the visual was an activity afforded only to the colonist in whose interest it was to portray the colonized in a way that benefited colonialism. Claiming to portray reality, Orientalist photographers like Marcelin Flandrin, painters like Delacroix, or filmmakers like David Butler cultivated a distorted and often dehumanized image of Moroccans. Many of these images, whether they were “ethnographic” or “artistic,” were then exhibited in the West to justify colonialism’s violent domination and exploitation of other peoples.[6] It was these colonial cinematographic and photographic activities that initially fomented suspicion of realistic-looking images that had up until then, been almost non-existent in Moroccan culture.

Today in a North African and West African (“Françafrique”) neo-colonial context, we can witness--in one form or another--indirect French control over cinema, including Moroccan cinema. At this point, it should be made clear that I do not believe that the entire body of films Moroccans produced has been influenced by or controlled by French institutions. Nor do I believe that all films that French institutions funded did not try to subvert French cultural aid to convey ideas that contradicted the neo-colonialist intentions of programs like the CAI (Consortium Audiovisuel International), ADEAC (Association pour le développement des échanges artistiques et culturels), the Bureau du Cinéma at the French Ministry of Cooperation, and Fonds Sud Cinéma. We can for example, cite Farida Belyazid’s Une Porte sur le Ciel (1988) as an example of the subversion of French funds, as she portrays a character that rejects French identity and embraces a Sufi Muslim identity as a means of reaching feminine emancipation. However, we must recognize that a significant portion of Moroccan filmmakers who have received French aid tend to fall along a Western liberal vision of Moroccan society--a trend that has been increasing after the explosion of neoliberal programs in the late 1990’s.

Nabil Ayouch entered the Moroccan cinema scene during the birth of neoliberal policy in Morocco. The credit rolls on his films make it clear that Ayouch receives funding from France or Belgium (from both public donors like the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Fonds Sud, and private donors like Canal+). French funding for African films is not a type of benevolence. As Manthia Diawara recounts, following the independence of many African colonies, France embarked on a policy with the French Ministry of Cooperation (now a part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), starting in 1961, which supported filmmakers in “Francophonie” in order to maintain French neo-colonial domination over Africa.[7] Diawara explains that there are two ways of identifying neocolonialism in French aid for African film: assimilation and monopolization. Assimilation, he writes, “is based on the premise of selecting a few Africans at the top and giving them the same privileges as French men and women. Directing films is one such privilege.” Monopolization, on the other hand, “conditions the directors to conform their scripts to acceptable French standards. It is in this sense that controversial and anticolonialist scripts such as La Noire de… are rejected.” While adored by French critics, a majority of the Moroccan Arabic-speaking public despises Much Loved, confirming the idea that the film is intended to serve a Western or Westernized audience and not the Moroccan public as a whole. It is no wonder then that the film has been screened at least eleven times in France within the first week of its showing at the Quinzaine des Realisateurs and months before it was intended for release in Morocco.

Much Loved as an Intersection Between Colonial and Sexist Discourse 

Catering to the West, Much Loved can function as a continuation of colonialist/imperialist discourse, defined by Ella Shohat and Robert Stam as “the linguistic and ideological apparatus that justifies, contemporaneously or even retroactively colonial/imperial practices.” In this case, the discourse is specific to women, women’s bodies, and the European Orientalist conception of the Muslim world as being more oppressive of women. In Women and Gender in Islam, Laila Ahmad describes how British patriarchal structures of governance deployed Western feminist discourse in colonial Egypt. These observations can also be applied to French colonialist discourses vis-à-vis the Maghreb. She writes, while they  “devised theories to contest the claims of feminism, and derided and rejected the ideas of feminism” in Europe, they simultaneously “captured the language of feminism and redirected it, in the service of colonialism, toward Other men and the cultures of Other men” in the colonies.[8]

Under a patriarchal-colonial system, the colonizer could at once speak of the need to liberate the Maghrebi woman from the Maghrebi man while photographing her nude, as a sexual object for colonial masculinist desires (desires that were often violently expressed in the rape of native women by colonizing armies). Jean-Hippolyte Flandrin, for example, like other colonial photographers and filmmakers, sometimes depicted Moroccan women as virgins--a common trope in colonial imagery denoting both native women and native lands as untouched objects to be penetrated--or as prostitutes who could be bought and sold, just like the land and its resources.[9] These images were directly used to attract French men to join the occupation forces in the Maghreb. Like its colonial predecessor, the male-dominated filmmaking apparatus in Morocco can deploy feminist rhetoric in a way that functions to the benefit of both imperialism and patriarchy. Thus, like Flandrin, Ayouch depicts the prostitutes in Much Loved as constantly ready to be penetrated, conjuring a male audience to collectively participate in this penetration as they consume his voyeuristic images, while simultaneously inviting a Western audience to penetrate the native land in order to continue to “civilize” Muslims (in this case about women’s rights).  

[Trailer for the film Much Loved.]

Indeed, it is enough to see the extracts and poster to understand how it can function in this way. From the extracts to the movie poster, one sees a consistent theme throughout reflecting the filmmakers’ position on this issue. A movie poster with a half-naked woman invitingly sucking on her finger is not inviting an audience to come understand how she was put in a position that led her to become a prostitute, but inviting a male audience to indulge in the very type of imagery that tends to fuel, not alleviate, sexual violence. This should come as no surprise, considering Nabil Ayouch’s other films. In Ali Zaoua (2000), there are only two minor female roles and they are both the object of masculinist desires. One role is that of a prostitute mother, the second of a young teenager whom a boy desires. In The Horses of God (2012), the only female roles are minor and the most significant of those characters are mothers, prostitutes, or both a prostitute and a mother at the same time. If we were, as some writers ask us, to understand Nabil Ayouch’s films as a “true” reflection of reality, we would come to the conclusion that Moroccan women are either would-be prostitutes, prostitutes, prostitute-mothers, or naive uneducated mothers.

Thus, Ayouch’s films serve to disempower the Moroccan woman while making European spectators feel better about their privileged and “enlightened” positions. While misogyny exists in both Europe and the former colonies, a misogynist colonial discourse still continues to permeate some Moroccan films. This is particularly the case after 2000, among the new generation of filmmakers like Ayouch, Nourredine Lakhmari, and to some extent, Faouzi Bensaidi. Like their colonial predecessors, these films instill the idea that only “Other men” in the “uncivilized” former colonies are truly oppressive of women, and therefore it is a part of the European civilizing mission to teach the colonized what gender relations should look like. But the colonial civilizing mission is neither benign nor gentle; its objective is not to educate and assist, but rather, “with a kind of perverted logic,” writes Fanon, “it turns its attention to the past of the colonized people and distorts it, disfigures it, and destroys it.”[10] Ultimately, it is a means to justify violence and exploitation. The mission to provide the native with a “real” culture has long been a disguise for violent imperial penetration, from the “white man’s burden” that set out to civilize Native American peoples but was in fact a genocidal process, to Operation Iraqi Freedom which set out to instill “democracy” but left at least half a million Iraqis dead. 

However, many Moroccans reject Western paternalism. In Between Feminism and Islam, Zakia Salime has effectively shown the decline of west-leaning feminist organizations (often funded by Western institutions) in Morocco. Instead, Moroccan women increasingly look to Islam and Moroccan traditions for a route to their emancipation.[11] Just as they reject Western feminism, many Moroccans reject Western depictions of women in cinema. Thus, they refuse Nabil Ayouch’s objectification of Moroccan women on the screen. This does not mean Moroccans do not objectify women in other ways, but rather that they are rejecting a specifically western (and additional) mode of oppressing them: the presentation of women through various forms of media as sexual objects to be consumed.

To conclude, Much Loved is a film that operated not within a vacuum but within a historic, social, political, and economic context, where almost half of the people are illiterate. Thus, we must delve deeper and we must contextualize the complex public discourse against the film, which ranges from explicitly feminist rejections of its portrayal of women, to misogynist comments towards the actresses, to insults (and even death threats) towards the filmmaker, in order to bring out its underlying meanings. Those who loudly expressed their anger towards the film cannot be dismissed as being incapable of understanding cinema, their beliefs can be of great value to Moroccan filmmakers looking to understand their audience. Their discontent with what they label pornographic content in the name of Realism can provide insight for those who seek to reach a wide viewership without necessarily having to resort to populist self-censorship. But the debate around Much Loved is not just useful for Moroccan cinéastes but can also offer filmmakers and critics in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa with an understanding of how a variety of women-- from “laïcard” to Islamist women-- perceive films that address women’s issues. It is important to note that males published most of the writings in the press in favor of the film. Having little access to the media, women primarily expressed themselves through informal channels. Perhaps in this case, hidden discourses expressed informally can have more value than formally expressed discourse in the press.


[1] Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. Unthinking Eurocentrism. 1994.

[2] Alea, Tomas G. The Viewer`s Dialectic. 1984.

[3] Getino, Octavio and Fernando Solanas. Towards a Third Cinema. 1969.

[4] Diawara, Manthia. African Cinema. 1992.

[5] Carter, Sandra G. What Moroccan Cinema?. 2009

[6] Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. Unthinking Eurocentrism. 1994.

[7] Diawara, Manthia. African Cinema. 1992.

[8] Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam. 1992.

[9] Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. Unthinking Eurocentrism. 1994.

[10] Fanon, Franz. The Wretched of the Earth. 1961

[11] Salime, Zakia. Between Feminism and Islam. 2011

Jul 26, 2015 Lebanon

Gay Hanging in Iran: Atrocities and Impersonations

Everybody on earth knows that a deal on Iran’s nuclear program was announced in mid-July. Everybody also knows that this apparent step toward peace launched a new stage in an old war: of propaganda.Proponents praise the possibility of a historic opening. Opponents—who include Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Republican Party—warn of disaster. Both sides want to expand their constituencies. In Western countries, gay communities—small but politically influential—are more and more the target for just this courtship and recruitment.

The right-wing pundit Amir Taheri greeted the nuclear deal with a storm of tweets and screeds condemning it. One 140-character charge drew special attention.

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Anyone’s first reaction would be some version of “My God.” It sounded horrible.  I wrote to Taheri asking for more information—and so, judging from Twitter, did at least three other people. 

But the story quickly began to show cracks. Taheri didn’t reply to me, or anybody. I sat down that night with a Farsi-speaking friend and began searching for the story in the Iranian press: under the youth’s name, under various other key words. It didn’t turn up anywhere. I wrote to the Toronto-based Iranian Queer Organization (IRQO), a diaspora-based group of LGBT Iranian activists with which I’ve worked closely over the years. They searched the media as well and found no sign of it. They also reached out to contacts in Isfahan. On Friday morning, they told me no one there had heard of the story, either.

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[Taheri on Fox News]

Amir Taheri lies a lot. Eight years ago, Jonathan Schwartz called him “one of the strangest ingredients in America’s media soup,” adding, “There may not be anyone else who simply makes things up as regularly as he does, with so few consequences.” An arch-conservative protege of the Pahlavis and an editor of the Tehran daily Kayhan under the Shah, he repeatedly fabricates stories about Iran to please right-wingers in his adoptive West. Most famously, in 2006 he claimed in Canada’s National Post that a new dress-code law in Iran would impose special clothes on religious minorities, including yellow badges for Jews. Many conservatives swallowed the story; even the Canadian Prime Minister repeated it. But it was a complete falsehood, and after a huge furor the National Post retracted it and apologized: “It is now clear the story is not true. . . . We apologize for the mistake and for the consternation it has caused.” (The Post also noted that Taheri went “unreachable” after his fiction was exposed, rather as he did on Twitter.) Undeterred, in 2008 Taheri concocted a quote from Ayatollah Khomeini, complete with a fake citation of an invented source; American neoconservative luminaries duly repeated it. In 2002, Taheri claimed that “Osama bin Laden is dead . . . the fugitive died in December and was buried in the mountains of southeast Afghanistan.” The list of his duplicities goes on and on. In 1989, an academic reviewing one of Taheri’s books 

detailed case after case in which Taheri cited nonexistent sources, concocted nonexistent substance in cases where the sources existed and distorted the substance beyond recognition when it was present. … [The reviewer] concluded that Nest of Spies was “the sort of book that gives contemporary history a bad name.”

Larry Cohler-Esses condemns Taheri as a “journalistic felon,” part of a “media machine intent on priming the public for war with Iran.”

There are ample grounds for skepticism about stories Taheri spreads. But skepticism doesn’t make headlines. Propaganda’s best friend is the ambition of the press. On Thursday, a reporter for the UK-based Gay Star News also tweeted to Taheri.

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Taheri did not answer him, either. I know this because the reporter didn’t wait for a source. About twenty-five minutes later, his story—“GAY TEEN, 14, ‘HANGED FROM TREE`”—topped the website of Gay Star News, and it said Taheri hadn’t told them anything. In other words, their entire account was based on one single tweet with no evidence behind it. This tweet was special, though. The topic of gay killings in Iran has shown its passionate drawing power over a decade, its ability to keep queers clicking. Gay Star News wanted the clicks for itself. 

The reporter clearly never asked Iranian LGBT activists or groups for their take. It was more important to get the headline out there. I wrote to Tris Reid-Smith, Gay Star News‘s editor, and asked, “Is this standard practice — to run a story based on a single, unsourced, unconfirmed tweet from someone who declines to answer follow-up questions?” Tris rather cannily refused to reply in writing; he wanted to talk by phone. My phone in Cairo is tapped; I declined. I wanted this on the record, but not State Security’s record. If Tris still wants to answer my question, he is welcome to do so here. Gay Star News has since added a few sentences to its story, saying:

we should note Iranian LGBTI networks have not confirmed the story. Some critics have questioned Taheri’s reliability. … UPDATE: For clarity, GSN has noted from the outset this report has not been independently verified. Taheri is yet to reply to our questions seeking to substantiate his claims. We urge caution but feel it is in the public interest to report the claims, given they are gaining traction on social media.

Let that final sentence revolve in your mind. What defines news these days isn’t truth. It’s traffic. (I have saved a screenshot of Gay Star News‘s original article, prior to the caution-urging, here.)

And of course the story spread. Neoconservative propagandist Ben Weinthal tweeted it no fewer than five times:

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Weinthal is a lobbyist for the right-wing, pro-Israel Foundation for Defense of Democracies. One of his jobs is to drum up support in gay communities for hardline policies against Iran. I have detailed some of his many misrepresentations here. His desperate drive to ensure Taheri’s tweet gets coverage suggests what the motives at work are. 

No one should ever minimize the real, documented, and terrible human rights abuses in Iran. But credulity for suspicious stories devalues the true ones. Given Taheri’s record, and the tangled political context, there is no reason to credit this tale without corroboration.

And here’s the thing: we have been through this before, and learned nothing. Look at the photo Gay Star News attached to its article.

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[From Gay Star News, 17 July 2015] 

That famous image, exactly ten years old, reverberates with misery and horror. And cynics and opportunists know it as proven clickbait. In fact, the two youths were not executed simply for “being gay.” They were convicted of the rape, at knifepoint, of a thirteen-year-old boy. Claims that they were gay lovers circulated widely among Western activists; but no clear evidence materialized to confirm them.

International tension shaped the context, then as now. In June 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected President of Iran. The religious hardliner’s victory intensified foreign fears of Iran’s nuclear plans; Ahmadinejad moved quickly to quash negotiations with European powers and smear reformists as appeasers. Western conservatives stoked those fears, and rumors roiled. Immediately after the vote, a website affiliated with the Mujahedin e Khalq claimed Ahmadinejad had participated in the 1979 seizure of the US embassy in Tehran. The Mujahedin is a wealthy, cult-like Iranian exile group widely despised in the diaspora, but closely tied to many Western politicians. Amir Taheri leapt in; he alleged in print  that Javad Zarif—then Iran’s UN ambassador, now its foreign minister—had joined the hostage-taking. (Another fabrication: Zarif was studying in the US at the time.) That summer, a charged, familiar storm-cloud of fact, anxiety, and speculation swirled round the subject of Iran. 

On 19 July 2005, the two teenagers were hanged in Mashhad. Reports in the local and national Iranian media said clearly they had been tried for tajavoz (rape) or lavat beh onf (“sodomy by force,” or male rape); the Quds newspaper in Mashhad quoted both the thirteen-year-old victim and his father. Another website of the Mujahedin e Khalq, however, published a piece on the execution aimed at Western audiences, and omitted the rape charge. It was almost certainly the Mujahedin who pointed out the story to UK lone-ranger activist Peter Tatchell -- who had a record of publicity-seeking animosity to both Iran and political Islam -- and suggested a “gay” angle. On July 21, Tatchell’s OutRage website blared, “IRAN EXECUTES GAY TEENAGERS,” above the pictures taken from the Iranian press. Tatchell claimed, falsely, that Iranian media had not mentioned the rape, and that the pair were originally charged with consensual sex: setting in motion a stream of fictions that didn’t stop for months.
 

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[Mr. DeMille? Mr. DeMille? TV crew films Peter Tatchell at a demo over the Mashhad case, 2005. Photo by UK Gay News]

With panic over Iran already in the air, the photos went vastly viral. If politics motivated some to promote the story, for others it was publicity.  (Doug Ireland, a US gay writer with no prior knowledge of Iran who nonetheless rode the story to a new journalistic job, told me his blog got 60,000 hits the first day he carried the pictures.) As more facts came out and the tale seemed less plausible, its proponents got aggressive: not only with doubters, but with the protagonists. Tatchell, for instance, belittled the alleged rape and suggested the victim wanted it: “It could be the thirteen-year-old was a willing participant.” Meanwhile, the story’s popularity led to a desperate search for sequels, for new “gay victims,” that stretched for years. Virtually any execution for rape reported in the Iranian media—even of male rapists of women—could be arrogated or mistranslated as a punishment for consensual gay sex. In a grim and grotesque irony, the quest helped produce the dead. In 2007, Tatchell intervened in the last-ditch appeal of an Iranian prisoner on death row, also for the rape of a thirteen-year-old. Makwan Mouloudzadeh had been framed in a village vendetta; there was no real evidence he’d had sexual relations with the child, much less any other male. Instead of maintaining Makwan’s innocence, though, Tatchell falsely alleged the child was Makwan’s “partner.” Allies of Tatchell started a letter-writing campaign to Ahmadeinjad pleading for the “young homosexual Makvan,” arguing explicitly that he was “‘guilty’ of having loved a peer when he was thirteen and having sexual intercourse with him.” They incriminated the man they were trying to save. Makwan, neither homosexual nor a rapist, was hanged.

The Mashhad story survives, immune to its malign consequences. Taheri certainly knows it—he surely suspected a fourteen-year-old victim would make his tweet go viral. The youths’ images are memed and manipulated everywhere. Sometimes the uses are political:

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Sometimes they are mythological figures, as if the kitsch of Shi’ite religious iconography melded with the preoccupations of San Francisco.

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[The Ultimate Penalty: painting by Miguel Tió] 

But they remain, always, “the sacred gay martyrs of Iran.”

An hour or two after the Gay Star News story appeared, Tatchell seized the opportunity, announcing a “vigil” to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the youth’s deaths.

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“On 19 July, we stand for life, liberty and love,” Tatchell said at the demo. But think what that rhetoric obliterates. If their thirteen-year-old victim’s story was true, what would he say about those words? Most human rights activists know that you can oppose grave abuses, like the appalling execution of children, without spinning narratives of absolute innocence or “love.” But to do that requires abjuring sentimentality, and acquiring maturity.

A deep narcissism lies pooled here. What does “never forget” them mean, when you never knew anything about them in the first place? No one has ever seriously sought to learn facts (rather than weave romances) about the youths’ lives; no one ever showed the least interest in the thirteen-year-old they allegedly brutalized; no one has ever tried to find their families, and hear what they think of their sons’ pictures being broadcast in this way, or inserted into a foreign story about “gayness.” The boys are silent. Their muteness is their appeal. They offer a clean field for Western political and erotic fantasies; they’ve withered to ventriloquist’s dolls for Western voices. The indignities they suffered before death have been succeeded by a further descent, the indignity of being erased in the imperial name of memory. What Tatchell wants remembered is not the murdered youths. It’s himself.

Strangely, I took two different tacks with Amir Taheri. The day after I politely asked him for information, you could have found me on Twitter writing in quite a different tone:

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Except that was not me. It was an account someone set up under my name about a week ago, which has been firing off tweets to Egyptians and various right-wing Westerners ever since. It says I’m a pro-Iran Islamist. It uses an old picture of me, and the inevitable photo of the hanged Iranian youth. 

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The account is not a “parody.” Not just that it is not funny: it is trying to get me arrested. It makes out that I support banned insurgent movements and want the Egyptian government overthrown. These messages it forwards to Egyptian tweeters, including government accounts.

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That one tweet could easily lead to a few decades in prison here. And the person who put my name to it appears quite conscious of the fact.

Who is behind this thing? I have no idea. But I know who likes it. Here are the account’s followers when I checked it on 16 July: 

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The third person who followed the account—out of seven at the time—was “All Equal.” That is the Twitter of Pliny Soocoormanee, who happens to be the personal assistant of Peter Tatchell, director of the Peter Tatchell Foundation. How he found out about this obscure account when no one else knew of it, and why it interested him so much, is a fascinating question. I cannot imagine the answer.

The morning after I criticized the Taheri story on Twitter, the account exploded with vengeful drivel, directed at people inside and outside Egypt (the one at top went to the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs):

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But this BS is merely typical. Apparently I work for the Brotherhood, an illegal organization here:

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My motives appear to be erotic as well as pecuniary.

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I am also an informer.

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But mostly the account just strives to identify me with vicious anti-Semitic ravings, marking the intrinsic fascism of its maker’s mind. (Fascism is the politics of a cynical, corrosive narcissism. The mark of fascism is that it imagines all other opinions are as fascist as itself.)

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The account is pretty much coeval with the nuclear deal with Iran. Its first three tweets:

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I would not pay attention to this crude fakery if it were not trying explicitly to incriminate me to Egypt’s government—which is arresting gay foreigners, and may not know the difference, or want to. I never cease to be surprised by the retributory malice of the Iran- and Islam-obsessed crowd, whether driven by ideology or the sheer love of headlines. They never stop.

Back in 2006, when Amir Taheri’s lies about Iran’s dress-code law were exposed, The Nation spoke to his PR agent. Accuracy on Iran is “a luxury,” she said. “As much as being accurate is important, in the end it’s important to side with what is right. What’s wrong is siding with the terrorists.” You see? It is us or them. Loyalty trumps truth. To expose useful lies is to take the terrorists’ side. And by that standard I am, of course, a terrorist.

Why does it matter? Because LGBT Iranians shouldn’t be exploited for propaganda. They lead lives seamed by danger, distinguished by courage; they deserve better than to be backgammon pieces, passive tokens stacked and shifted in a great-power political game. LGBT people should speak in their own voices, be masters and heroes of their own lives. That is what the liberation struggle is about.

The fact that nobody—not Tatchell, not Ben Weinthal, not Gay Star News—bothered to ask LGBT Iranian activists or groups what the truth was, or whether they wanted a demonstration, is appalling. But it is typical. The story of Western engagement with LGBT rights in Iran has been one of occupation and ventriloquism, not freedom. It’s long past time for the sick game to stop.

Postscript: The fake account seems to have been taken down not long after I first posted this. I do not know whether by its maker or by Twitter (of course I complained). But, in some form or another, they will be back.


[This article was originally published A Paper Bird and is re-posted with permission.]